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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Federal Railway Safety Act (“FRSA”) provides 
that railroad carriers may not retaliate against employees who 
blow the whistle on certain safety violations. If a carrier breaks 
this rule, the aggrieved employee may seek relief by filing a 
complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) “not later than 180 days” after the 
alleged retaliation occurred. See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii). The Secretary of Labor then has 210 days 
to issue a “final decision” on the matter. If the Secretary takes 
too long, “the employee may bring an original action … for de 
novo review in the appropriate district court of the United 
States.” Id. § 20109(d)(3).  
 
This case asks whether FRSA’s 180-day limitations 
period is “jurisdictional.” That is, if an employee fails to file a 
timely complaint with OSHA, does that divest a district court 
of subject matter jurisdiction? Or is the limitations period 
simply a claim-processing rule, the breach of which may defeat 
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an employee’s claim, but not a district court’s jurisdiction to 
hear the case? 
 
After considering the text, context, and history of the 
provision, and mindful of the Supreme Court’s decisions in this 
area, we hold that FRSA’s 180-day limitations period in 49 
U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii) is a nonjurisdictional claim-
processing rule. The District Court assumed otherwise, but we 
will affirm the District Court’s decision on other grounds. 
 
I 
A 
Congress enacted FRSA in 1970 “to promote safety in 
every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related 
accidents and incidents.” 49 U.S.C. § 20101. Ten years later, 
Congress added an anti-retaliation provision to the statute, 
protecting “employees who alerted authorities about a 
violation of federal safety regulations.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. 
Perez, 778 F.3d 507, 509 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Pub. L. No. 
96-423, § 10, 94 Stat. 1811 (1980)). Under the amended law, 
employees who thought themselves the victims of retaliation 
could seek relief through mandatory arbitration under the 
Railway Labor Act before the National Railroad Adjustment 
Board. Id. at 510. Except in narrow circumstances, the decision 
of the Adjustment Board was final and mostly unreviewable by 
courts. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 
(1978) (“Congress considered it essential to keep these so-
called ‘minor’ disputes within the Adjustment Board and out 
of the courts.” (citation omitted)). 
 
In 2007, Congress amended FRSA again, untangling its 
retaliation-dispute-resolution scheme from the Railway Labor 
Act and giving it to the Secretary of Labor, subject to expanded 
judicial oversight. See Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1521, 
121 Stat. 266 (2007). The point of this was to “expand the 
protections for railroad employees” and to “enhance 
employees’ administrative and civil remedies.” Perez, 778 
F.3d at 510 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Today, FRSA and its accompanying regulations provide 
for a straightforward, multi-step adjudication process for 
retaliation complaints.  
 
First, if an employee thinks she has been wronged in 
violation of the Act, she must file a complaint with OSHA “not 
later than 180 days after the date on which the alleged violation 
… occurs.” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii), (d)(1); 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 1982.103–104.1 OSHA will then investigate the claims and 
issue written findings and a preliminary order “as to whether 
or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent 
has retaliated against the complainant in violation of … 
FRSA.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1982.105(a), 1982.104. 
 
Second, any unsatisfied party may object to OSHA’s 
findings or preliminary order within 30 days and request a 
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Id. 
§ 1982.106.2 The ALJ may conduct a hearing on the record and 
must issue a decision containing “appropriate findings, 
conclusions, and an order pertaining to … remedies.” Id. 
§ 1982.109(a); see id. § 1982.107(b). 
 
Third, within 14 days of the ALJ’s decision, any party 
may petition for review from the Administrative Review Board 
(“ARB”). Id. § 1982.110(a). If the ARB accepts the case, it has 
                                              
1 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(1) provides: 
 
An employee who alleges 
discharge, discipline, or other 
discrimination in violation of 
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this 
section, may seek relief in 
accordance with the provisions of 
this section, with any petition or 
other request for relief under this 
section to be initiated by filing a 
complaint with the Secretary of 
Labor. 
 
2 If no party objects, then OSHA’s preliminary findings 
become the “final decision of the Secretary.” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1982.106(b). 
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120 days to issue a final decision for the Secretary. Id. 
§ 1982.110(c). If the ARB rejects a case, the ALJ’s decision 
becomes the Secretary’s final order. Id. § 1982.110(b). 
 
Finally, any person “adversely affected or aggrieved” 
by the Secretary’s final decision as issued by the ARB3 may, 
within 60 days, “obtain review of the order in the United States 
court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation, with 
respect to which the order was issued, allegedly occurred or the 
circuit in which the complainant resided on the date of such 
violation.” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(4). 
 
This process is what happens if the agency is 
expeditious. But if the agency takes too long to issue a final 
decision, FRSA provides a so-called “kick-out” option for 
claimants to seek “de novo review” in federal district court. 
 
De novo review.—With respect to 
a complaint under paragraph (1), if 
the Secretary of Labor has not 
issued a final decision within 210 
days after the filing of the 
complaint and if the delay is not 
due to the bad faith of the 
employee, the employee may bring 
an original action at law or equity 
for de novo review in the 
appropriate district court of the 
United States, which shall have 
jurisdiction over such an action 
without regard to the amount in 
controversy, and which action 
shall, at the request of either party 
to such action, be tried by the court 
with a jury. 
 
                                              
3 If nobody objects to OSHA’s preliminary order, 
making that decision the “final decision of the Secretary,” the 
parties may not later seek judicial review. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1982.106(b). The same goes for an unappealed order of an 
ALJ. Id. § 1982.110(b). 
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Id. § 20109(d)(3). This kick-out provision and the 180-day 
limitations period are the focus of this case. 
 
B 
 
John Guerra, Jr. worked as a conductor and brakeman 
for Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”). He alleges that, 
in late 2015, Conrail urged him to cut corners and ignore safety 
regulations to increase productivity. When he refused, Conrail 
threatened him and eliminated certain incidental perks of his 
job. Guerra reported this alleged retaliation to Conrail’s 
compliance office, which told him that his complaints would 
be “handled in a confidential manner.” App. 29. But Conrail 
did nothing to alleviate his concerns. Instead, he says, he was 
told that he needed to “play ball” with the company and that, if 
he kept reporting safety issues, there would be “undesirable 
consequences.” App. 29–30. Likewise, in early 2016, Guerra 
filed six complaints about allegedly defective braking systems 
in two Conrail locomotives. Yet again, he says, the only 
response was that he needed to toe the company line for his 
own good.  
 
Shortly after that, a train Guerra was operating failed to 
brake properly and ran through a railroad switch. Conrail 
investigated the incident and, on April 6, 2016, notified Guerra 
that he would be suspended for 45 days. As Guerra tells it, a 
supervisor informed him this should “be a lesson to him” and 
that Guerra should “be more cooperative.” App. 31. 
 
On May 10, 2016, Guerra’s attorney, Lawrence Katz, 
allegedly “filed a FRSA complaint with the Secretary of 
Labor’s Region II [OSHA] Whistleblower Office.” Guerra v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., No. 17-cv-6497, 2018 WL 2947857, at *2 
(D.N.J. June 13, 2018). Six months passed by. Seeing no 
response from OSHA, on November 28, 2016, Katz followed 
up with OSHA by email and attached a copy of the complaint. 
 
OSHA notified Guerra in early 2017 that his claim was 
dismissed as untimely because his complaint had been filed 
more than 180 days after the alleged violation. According to 
the agency’s letter, Conrail’s alleged retaliation against Guerra 
happened on April 6, 2016, but OSHA first received Guerra’s 
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complaint on November 28, 2016—237 days later. As for 
Guerra’s supposed May 10 complaint: 
 
There is no evidence that such a 
complaint was filed with the 
Regional Office. Furthermore, 
previous complaints filed by 
Complainant’s attorney in other 
matters were faxed or sent by 
tracked delivery. There is nothing 
to indicate this complaint was ever 
filed with OSHA or circumstances 
to allow tolling.  
 
App. 57.  
 
Guerra objected to OSHA’s dismissal and requested a 
hearing before an ALJ. He submitted affidavits from his 
attorneys that detailed their normal procedures for preparing 
and mailing complaints to OSHA. These affidavits, Guerra 
argued, provided enough evidence to invoke the common-law 
mailbox rule’s presumption of delivery. But the ALJ thought 
otherwise, finding that Guerra’s “self-serving affidavits” 
nowhere revealed “who drafted the complaint, who dictated the 
complaint, and most importantly, who mailed the complaint.” 
App. 117. So the ALJ held that the mailbox rule did not apply 
and dismissed Guerra’s claim for untimeliness.  
 
Guerra initially appealed the ALJ’s decision to the 
ARB, but then opted to kick out his claim to federal court 
because more than 210 days had elapsed since OSHA had 
received his complaint. See In re: Guerra v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., (Conrail), ARB No. 2017-069, 2018 WL 6978223 
(DOL Admin. Rev. Bd. June 29, 2018).4 Conrail moved to 
                                              
4 The ARB accepted the case and issued a briefing 
schedule, but Guerra failed to file his opening brief as ordered. 
In re: Guerra, 2018 WL 6978223, at *1. Guerra also 
apparently failed to notify the ARB that he had filed a 
complaint in federal court. Id. at *1 n.4; 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1982.114(c). In any event, after the District Court issued its 
decision, the ARB dismissed Guerra’s case for lack of 
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dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1), asserting that Guerra’s failure to file a timely 
complaint with OSHA deprived the District Court of 
jurisdiction over the case. Conrail also moved in the alternative 
under Rule 56 for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
record refuted Guerra’s only theory of timeliness. In response, 
Guerra agreed that the District Court would lack jurisdiction if 
his complaint had been untimely filed, but asserted that, under 
the mailbox rule, his attorneys had timely mailed his complaint 
to OSHA on May 10. 
 
The District Court accepted without scrutiny the parties’ 
agreement that the Court would lack jurisdiction if Guerra had 
untimely filed his complaint with OSHA. And finding that 
Guerra’s evidence was not enough to invoke the presumption 
of the common-law mailbox rule, the Court dismissed his 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Guerra timely appealed.  
 
II 
 
The District Court had putative jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3). We have putative 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. And we “always [have] 
jurisdiction to determine [our] own jurisdiction.” White-Squire 
v. United States Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted). 
 
At the outset, the District Court erred by accepting 
without scrutiny the parties’ accord on its supposed lack of 
jurisdiction. The Court had “an independent obligation to 
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exist[ed], even 
in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Hartig Drug Co. 
Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co. Ltd., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). 
So even though both sides agreed that jurisdiction would not 
exist over an untimely complaint, the District Court was still 
obliged to make sure the parties were right. Id. And because, 
as we explain below, the parties were wrong, the Court, by 
accepting their agreement, also failed its “strict duty to exercise 
the jurisdiction that [was] conferred upon [it] by Congress.” 
                                              
jurisdiction “on the ground that Guerra ha[d] removed it to 
district court.” In re: Guerra, 2018 WL 6978223, at *1.  
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Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) 
(“[F]ederal courts ‘have no more right to decline the exercise 
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not.’” 
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 
(1821))). 
 
Thus, on appeal, “regardless of the acquiescence or 
wishes of the parties, we must question whether the District 
Court properly treated [FRSA’s statute of limitations] as a 
jurisdictional issue under Rule 12(b)(1).” Hartig, 836 F.3d at 
267. We exercise de novo review over that legal conclusion. 
Id. at 267 n.8.  
 
III 
 
This case presents two questions. First, does an 
untimely administrative complaint under FRSA’s 180-day 
statute of limitations deprive a district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction? Second, did Guerra timely file his complaint with 
OSHA? 
 
A 
 
The first question presented “concerns the distinction 
between two sometimes confused or conflated concepts: 
federal-court ‘subject-matter’ jurisdiction over a controversy; 
and the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief.” 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503. To keep these concepts distinct, the 
Supreme Court has classified statutory requirements (for 
example, FRSA’s 180-day limitations rule) as either 
“jurisdictional conditions” or “claim-processing rules.” See 
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010). The 
distinction between these types “can be confusing in practice,” 
so we must conduct a “close analysis” of the provision at issue. 
Id.   
 
“Jurisdiction,” properly defined, refers to a court’s 
“adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 
(2004). This authority—the “judicial Power”—flows from 
Article III of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, but 
Congress, under Article I, has nearly “plenary” power to shape 
its scope by statute. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 
(2018) (plurality op.); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 
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(2007) (“Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what 
cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.”). A 
statute is thus “jurisdictional” if it “delineat[es] the classes of 
cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) [or] the persons (personal 
jurisdiction) implicating that authority.” Muchnick, 559 U.S. at 
160–61 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 
Claim-processing rules, by contrast, “seek to promote 
the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties 
take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 
(2011). Rules of this sort, even if important and mandatory, 
“do[] not reduce the adjudicatory domain of a tribunal.” Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. 
Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009); 
see United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 
(2015). 
 
The difference between these categories is not mere 
semantics. Among other things, although our adversarial legal 
system generally adheres to the principle of party 
presentation,5 as noted above, “federal courts have an 
independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the 
scope of their jurisdiction[.]” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434. So 
if a statutory condition is jurisdictional, a court must “raise and 
decide” whether that condition has been satisfied, even if the 
parties overlooked or elected not to press the issue. Id.; 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 
1843, 1849 (2019). Likewise, jurisdictional defects cannot be 
forfeited or waived by the parties and are not subject to 
equitable tolling, while the opposite is true of claim-processing 
defects. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; Union Pac., 558 U.S. 
at 81–82; see also United States v. Kalb, 891 F.3d 455, 459–60 
(3d Cir. 2018). As a result, “[j]urisdictional rules may also 
result in the waste of judicial resources and may unfairly 
prejudice litigants.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434; see Arbaugh, 
546 U.S. at 508–09 (explaining that the defendant first raised a 
supposed jurisdictional defect two weeks after trial).  
                                              
5 “That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for 
decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of 
matters the parties present.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 
U.S. 237, 243 (2008). 
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Because of these “harsh consequences” that flow from 
labeling a statute “jurisdictional,” we apply a bright-line test, 
looking for whether Congress has “clearly state[d]” that this 
treatment is appropriate. See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1849–50 
(citations omitted); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16. This is not a 
matter of magic words. Yet absent a clear indication that 
Congress intended to imbue a condition with jurisdictional 
significance, we will “treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional 
in character.” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 
145, 153–54 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1850. We look for a clear 
statement in the statute’s “text, context, and relevant historical 
treatment.” Kalb, 891 F.3d at 460 (quoting Muchnick, 559 U.S. 
at 166). 
 
Finally, we consider these principles against the 
backdrop that Congress has granted federal district courts 
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. FRSA “surely is a law of the United States.” Arbaugh, 
546 U.S. at 505 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
So “[t]he question, then, is not whether [FRSA’s 180-day 
statute of limitations] confers jurisdiction, but whether [it] 
removes the jurisdiction given to the federal courts.” Whitman 
v. Dep’t of Transp., 547 U.S. 512, 514 (2006). 
 
1 
 
The plain text of FRSA’s 180-day statute of limitations 
nowhere shows that it bears jurisdictional weight. See 49 
U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii). On the contrary, it “speaks only 
to a claim’s timeliness, not to a court’s power.” Kwai Fun 
Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632. Put differently, “it does not speak in 
jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of 
the district courts.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 394 (1982).  
 
To be sure, Congress used mandatory language—“[a]n 
action … shall be commenced not later than 180 days….” 
§ 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). But emphatic words 
are not enough to make a statute jurisdictional. See Kwai Fun 
Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632 (explaining that a filing deadline is 
rarely jurisdictional, “even when the time limit is important 
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(most are) and even when it is framed in mandatory terms 
(again, most are)”); Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439 (“[W]e have 
rejected the notion that ‘all mandatory prescriptions, however 
emphatic, are ... properly typed jurisdictional.’” (quoting 
Union Pac., 558 U.S. at 81)). In short, the question is whether 
Congress intended to limit courts’ “adjudicatory authority,” 
not whether Congress intended to bar untimely claims. See 
Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1851 (“[A] prescription does not become 
jurisdictional whenever it promotes important congressional 
objectives.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 
2 
 
Nor does the provision’s context speak in jurisdictional 
terms. Indeed, subsection (d)(2) is titled simply “Procedure,” 
which “suggests Congress regarded the [180]-day limit as a 
claim-processing rule.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439; 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20109(d)(2). And none of the procedures listed in subsection 
(d)(2) have even a slight jurisdictional tinge. 
 
Conrail argues otherwise, relying on a series of linking 
inferences between three other subsections. First, subsection 
(d)(1) requires that “any petition or other request for relief … 
be initiated by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.” 
§ 20109(d)(1). Next, subsection (d)(2)(A)(ii)—the “statute of 
limitations”—applies to “[a]n action under paragraph (1)” 
(referring to subsection (d)(1)). Id. § 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii). And 
last, subsection (d)(3)—the kick-out provision (Conrail’s 
supposed jurisdictional hook)—states that it applies “[w]ith 
respect to a complaint under paragraph (1).” Id. § 20109(d)(3). 
Construed together, Conrail says, these provisions mean that, 
“[i]f a complainant does not file a valid [i.e., timely] complaint 
under paragraph 1 … then there is simply no predicate 
‘complaint under paragraph (1)’ over which § 20109(d)(3) 
could confer jurisdiction to the district court.” Appellee’s 
Supp. Letter Br. 4 (“Construing this language as a whole 
demonstrates Congress’[s] intent to confer jurisdiction, 
through § 20109(d)(3), only over complaints satisfying the 
mandatory limitations period of § 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii).”). 
 
But this interpretation reads a non-existent modifier into 
§ 20109(d)(3). Nothing in that subsection’s text states that it 
applies only to “valid” or “timely” complaints. Nor does the 
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limitations rule’s textual proximity to the kick-out provision 
show jurisdictional purpose. See Auburn, 568 U.S. at 155 (“A 
requirement we would otherwise classify as nonjurisdictional 
… does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed 
in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional 
provisions.”); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) 
(“Mere proximity will not turn a rule that speaks in 
nonjurisdictional terms into a jurisdictional hurdle.”). And 
more: Conrail’s argument disregards the “structural divide 
built into the statute” between the various subsections. Kwai 
Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633 (“Congress’s separation of a 
filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the 
time bar is not jurisdictional.”). 
 
3 
 
Nor do the provision’s history or purpose display any 
clear congressional intent to create a jurisdictional bar. And 
without such a clear statement, we refuse to divine the 
legislative history. See Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633 
(“[E]ven assuming legislative history alone could provide a 
clear statement (which we doubt), none does so here.”). 
 
This lack of jurisdictional pedigree distinguishes this 
case from Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007). There, 
because of its “longstanding treatment” of Article III appellate 
deadlines as jurisdictional, the Supreme Court held that a 
party’s failure to timely appeal a district court judgment 
divested jurisdiction from the court of appeals. Bowles, 551 
U.S. at 210–11; Union Pac., 558 U.S. at 82 (explaining that 
Bowles “rel[ied] on a long line of this Court’s decisions left 
undisturbed by Congress”). No such “longstanding treatment” 
exists here. 
 
Instead, FRSA’s statute of limitations is simply another 
example of the Supreme Court’s admonition that “most time 
bars are nonjurisdictional.” Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 
1632; see Auburn, 568 U.S. at 154 (“[W]e have repeatedly held 
that filing deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional.” (citations 
omitted)); Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435 (“Filing deadlines, such 
as the 120–day filing deadline at issue here, are quintessential 
claim-processing rules.”); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 
401, 413–14 (2004); Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455–56; see also T 
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Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, 913 F.3d 311, 324 (3d 
Cir. 2019) (“Caution is indeed warranted because statutes of 
limitations and other filing deadlines ordinarily are not 
jurisdictional.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). Overall, these cases emphasize that “Congress must 
do something special, beyond setting an exception-free 
deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional[.]” 
Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632. 
 
So too here. Congress has not clearly stated that FRSA’s 
statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Not only are we the first 
federal appellate court to address this specific question, but 
agency filing deadlines are typically nonjurisdictional. So the 
provision has no longstanding jurisdictional pedigree. See 
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210–11. We thus decline to read a 
jurisdictional bar into the statute.  
 
4 
 
Conrail makes two arguments in rebuttal. Neither is 
persuasive. 
 
First, Conrail says that, “because the administrative 
process under FRSA is designed to fully adjudicate an 
employee’s claim, … district court jurisdiction is narrowly 
drawn and the filing of an administrative complaint under 
FRSA carries jurisdictional significance.” Appellee’s Supp. 
Letter Br. 3. Conrail thus compares FRSA to “statutory 
schemes that channel certain claims to administrative agency 
adjudication first, followed by judicial review in a federal 
court.” Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1851 (citing Elgin v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), and Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. 
Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994)). 
 
But this argument falters from the start because it is 
nowhere “fairly discernible in the statutory scheme” that 
Congress intended “to preclude district court jurisdiction.” 
Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. FERC, 897 F.3d 187, 195 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (citing Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207). On the 
contrary, at issue is FRSA’s kick-out provision, which 
effectively allows an employee to start her case over from 
scratch in a federal district court, bringing “an original action 
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at law or equity for de novo review.” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3) 
(emphasis added).  
 
Second, Conrail analogizes FRSA to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (2002). SOX’s anti-retaliation provision is very similar to 
FRSA’s. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b), with 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20109(d). Conrail points to a few district court decisions 
dismissing SOX claims “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
where the complainant failed to file a timely administrative 
complaint.” Appellee’s Supp. Letter Br. 5 (citing Delmore v. 
McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., No. 12-CV-1306-JPS, 2013 WL 
3717741, at *2 (E.D. Wis. July 12, 2013); Mart v. Forest River, 
Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 577, 599 (N.D. Ind. 2012); Nieman v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907 (C.D. Ill. 
2010); Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802 (N.D. 
Tex. 2003)). 
 
But these cases are all merely “drive-by jurisdictional 
rulings” that easily “miss the critical differences between true 
jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on 
causes of action.” Muchnick, 559 U.S. at 161 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); see, e.g., King v. Ind. 
Harbor Belt R.R., No. 2:15-CV-245-JD-PRC, 2017 WL 
9565363, at *7–9 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2017) (analyzing and 
critiquing the haphazard “jurisdictional” language used by 
many district courts in the SOX context). In other words, these 
decisions are “less than meticulous” with how they “use[] the 
label ‘jurisdictional.’” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454–55. They 
simply assume that SOX’s time limit implicates courts’ subject 
matter jurisdiction, without ever applying Arbaugh’s clear-
statement test. So Conrail’s argument-by-analogy fails.  
 
B 
 
Although the District Court incorrectly dismissed 
Guerra’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction, Conrail moved in 
the alternative before the District Court for summary judgment 
under Rule 56. We “may affirm the District Court’s order on 
any basis supported by the record,” United States v. Rivera-
Cruz, 904 F.3d 324, 326 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted), and we will do so if “there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and … [Conrail] is entitled 
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to judgment as a matter of law.” Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n-
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n Pension Fund v. Comm’r, 523 
F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
 
As explained above, FRSA’s statute of limitations is 
simply a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. But it still has 
teeth. See 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii); Kwai Fun Wong, 
135 S. Ct. at 1632 (explaining “statute-of-limitations language, 
saying only what every time bar, by definition, must: that after 
a certain time a claim is barred”). In other words, “any alleged 
unfavorable personnel action occurring more than 180 days 
before [Guerra] file[d] an OSHA complaint is not actionable.” 
Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1211 (10th Cir. 
2018); see Mercier v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 850 F.3d 382, 388 
(8th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he ALJ correctly found that any adverse 
employment action that occurred [more than 180 days before 
the complaint was filed] would not be actionable due to the 
operation of the statute of limitations.”).6 
 
So we must determine when Guerra first filed his 
complaint with OSHA. He says that his lawyers filed it by first-
class mail on May 10, 2016. But OSHA found that it first 
received the complaint on November 28, 2016, when Guerra’s 
lawyers contacted OSHA by email. The former date would 
have been timely, the latter would not. Guerra tries to escape 
this pickle by invoking the common-law mailbox rule. 
 
In general, statutory filing conditions require “actual, 
physical delivery.” Phila. Marine, 523 F.3d at 147. Since this 
is doable by mail, we apply the common-law mailbox rule “[t]o 
help determine when the pertinent document was physically 
delivered.” Id. The gist of this rule is that, “if a letter properly 
directed is proved to have been either put into the post-office 
or delivered to the postman, it is presumed … that it reached 
its destination at the regular time, and was received by the 
                                              
6 Guerra has never argued that equitable tolling would 
save his otherwise untimely complaint to OSHA. For that 
reason, we need not decide whether the FRSA filing deadline 
is a “mandatory” claim-processing rule that must be applied if 
raised. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710, 
714–15 (2019). We take no position here on whether such 
tolling may be available or appropriate in other similar cases. 
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person to whom it was addressed.” Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. 
Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
 
The record contains affidavits from Guerra’s lawyers—
Lawrence Katz and Robert Myers. Katz verified that his 
normal practice was, after preparing a cover letter and 
complaint, to instruct his assistant to send them “by both 
certified mail and Fax.” App. 141, 159. He also noted that, on 
top of certified mail and fax, these documents “would also 
sometimes be transmitted by ordinary first-class mail.” Id. But 
Katz and Myers conceded that Guerra’s complaint was 
supposedly sent only by first-class mail. This discrepancy, they 
say, was “due to a clerical oversight.” Appellant’s Br. 9; see id. 
at 21.  
 
This evidence is not enough to invoke the mailbox 
rule’s presumption of delivery. To be sure, “receipt can be 
proven circumstantially by introducing evidence of business 
practices or office customs related to mail,” at least where the 
affiant has “personal knowledge of the procedures in place at 
the time of the mailing.” Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 319–20 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). But Guerra’s 
circumstantial evidence of his lawyers’ typical mailing 
procedures is irrelevant because, “due to a clerical oversight,” 
those procedures were admittedly not followed. So this case is 
not like Lupyan, where the sender produced two affidavits, 
both of which showed “personal knowledge of [the sender’s] 
customary mailing practices,” and one of which was by the 
sender’s employee who “swore that she personally prepared 
the Letter and placed it in the outgoing mail bin.” Id. at 320. 
Nor is it like Philadelphia Marine, where the sender produced 
meaningful, relevant circumstantial evidence such as 
testimony of an express acknowledgement of receipt and a 
computer printout apparently reflecting metadata of the letter’s 
drafting date. See 523 F.3d at 153.  
 
Here, by contrast, we have only Katz’s and Myers’s 
bare assertions—artfully phrased in the passive voice—that 
Guerra’s complaint “was transmitted” to OSHA by first-class 
mail. App. 148, 157; see App. 153. But neither affiant was 
involved in the mailing process. We agree with the District 
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Court that these unsupported, second-hand accounts cannot 
invoke the mailbox rule’s presumption.7  
 
Guerra protests that this logic is “blatantly 
unreasonable” because it puts “such a high evidentiary burden 
on the employee.” Appellant’s Br. 25. We disagree. The person 
or entity mailing a complaint, letter, notice, or other document 
is in the best position to control whether direct evidence exists 
later to confirm that mailing if it becomes an issue. See Lupyan, 
761 F.3d at 322 (“In this age of computerized communications 
and handheld devices, it is certainly not expecting too much to 
require businesses that wish to avoid a material dispute about 
the receipt of a letter to use some form of mailing that includes 
verifiable receipt when mailing something as important as a 
legally mandated [complaint].”). Guerra failed to do that here, 
and his circumstantial evidence is too thin to create a genuine 
issue of material fact.  
                                              
7 Even if Guerra’s evidence were reliable enough to 
merit a presumption of delivery, at most, that presumption 
would be “very weak.” Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 319–20 (holding 
that only a weak presumption exists “where delivery is sent via 
regular mail, for which no receipt, or other proof of delivery, 
is generated”). Stacked against OSHA’s denial of receipt, that 
presumption would disappear. Id. at 320–21. And the 
remaining competing evidence would not create a genuine 
issue of material fact about whether OSHA “actual[ly], 
physical[ly]” received the complaint that could prevent 
summary judgment. See Phila. Marine, 523 F.3d at 147. The 
dated cover letter Guerra produced at best suggests nothing 
more than that it was drafted (not necessarily sent) before the 
administrative deadline. App. 161.  But unlike the metadata in 
Philadelphia Marine, the bare letter does not reliably establish 
the date of drafting. And OSHA’s denial of receipt is 
strengthened by its practice of tracking correspondence and its 
unavailing search for a trace of Guerra’s letter. See Lupyan, 
761 F.3d at 322 (“[I]t may be routine business practice to log 
incoming mail. In such cases, the absence of an entry in a mail 
log near the time that mail would likely have arrived, can be 
used to establish that mail was not received.”). 
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IV 
 
FRSA’s 180-day statute of limitations is a 
nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. The District Court 
thus incorrectly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
But Guerra’s claim still fails because he has not produced 
enough reliable evidence to invoke the common-law mailbox 
rule. So his administrative complaint was untimely and his 
claim is barred. We will thus affirm the District Court’s 
judgment on other grounds. 
